The signing of deal at Doha, Qatar between America and the Afghans does in no way indicate a halt in attrition.  The fractured peace would witness tribal infighting. Rumours have been afloat that cadres of Haqqani network would infiltrate into Kashmir for pro active confrontation with the Indian Forces.

By Col Bipin Pathak (Retd), Military Intelligence

The signing of deal at Doha, Qatar between America and the Afghans does in no way indicate a halt in attrition.  The fractured peace would witness tribal infighting.  

Personally I am of the opinion that the cadres would only be infiltrated once there is compatibility in command between Taliban and the other groups operating in Afghanistan after eviction of USA.

Initially, once Taliban gets into governance they would not only be addressing social, economic and cultural issues but would also be contesting space domination with groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Haqanni network.

Rumours have been afloat that cadres of Haqqani network would infiltrate into Kashmir for pro active confrontation with the Indian Forces.

Haqqani network has strength of between 8000 to 10000 cadres. Presently, they operate from Afghanistan. Pak ISI had/has been supporting this organisation. It seems Haqqani network has split from Taliban and have become an affliate of Al Qaeda.

In 2014, the Pakistani Army had launched Op Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan aimed at neutralizing militants both foreign and domestic, including the Haqqani network from its soil. From the beginning of the Zarb-eAzb operation, doubts existed over the seriousness of Pakistan’s policy change toward the Haqqani network.  

In 2015, Pakistan also banned the Haqqani network as part of its National Action Plan. 

The ISI has aided Haqqani network to expand its penetration and maintain its influence in southeast Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to view the group as an asset.  A large swathe of Afghanistan is still controlled by Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIS and Haqqani network and they carry out frequent attacks on the public and government.

Officially Haqqani network has been subsumed under the larger Taliban and Quetta Shura Taliban, however the Haqqani’s maintain distinct command and control and lines of operations. Haqqani network maintains a safe haven in North Waziristan and across Afghanistan’s southeastern border.

Taliban are expected to oppose and deny a foothold to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on Afghan soil.

Haqqani network being affiliated with Al Qaeda may find it difficult to spare cadres for Kashmir as after the deal as proposed by USA is implemented Taliban would be in power and Haqqani network would be fighting for its subsistence in area dominated by them.

Likely shift from targeting American / NATO troops to infighting between various ethno-linguistic groups such as  Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek,  Baloch, Pashai, Nuristani, Gujjar and a few others.

After getting into the seat of power, the Taliban may not be interested in Kashmir as they would have to focus on groups like ISIS, Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda.

The strength of ISIS in Afghanistan comprising of defected members of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban that found its foothold in the country in 2015, is confirmed, but estimates place its numbers between 3,000-5,000 militants.

At present, the Taliban will be more interested in regaining the ground lost to ISIS than offering its energies to the Kashmir cause.

Al Qaeda has also shown signs of rebuilding and given how their sectarian nature aligns with that of ISIS, either of the two may well subsume the other in future along with Haqqani network, thereby the fluid Afghanistan would continue to face internecine warfare hence the likelihood of Taliban or Haqqani network dispatching cadres unlike 80s and 90s seem remote.

In 80s and 90s the foreign militants had operated from Sopore, the erstwhile so called liberated Zone.

As after the American departure even Haqqani network would be desirous of sharing the throne at Kabul and their intent to transcend Afghanistan borders into Kashmir during this transformative landscape seems remote as their presence in governance would be critical for their own existence. 

However, their future road map would have Kashmir as its agenda; hence the caution has to be exercised along Line of Control and volatile areas in the hinterland to prevent their infiltration which they may do along with cadres of Jaish e Mohammad and Lashkar e Toiba.

Pakistan will not change its calculus towards asymmetric warfare and thereby would endeavor to infiltrate Afghan groups as soon as the country becomes stable after the American departure and after the groups have overcome their war fatigue.

Surprisingly, on 08 Aug 2109, Afghan Taliban which is a Pakistan proxy commented on revocation of Article 370 by issuing a neutral statement urging India and Pak to exercise restrain which seems not in consonance with International Muslim solidarity.

This statement could be assessed as giving priority to national issues rather than meddle in sub continent affairs.

Another threat perception which has to be considered and addressed by our decision makers is the likelihood of a small fraction of non Afghan militants infiltrating to support Kashmir’s.

As departing for their respective countries will be a predicament for most of these ideological militants. If a repeat of early 90s occur and results in instability, far reaching consequences would reverberate not only in the valley but also between the two adversaries India and Pakistan.

Immediate serious implications of Afghan peace on Kashmir would hardly be visible but the American departure may act as an inspiration for the local youths to continue with violence and unrest.

The question that strikes the mind is which group of Afghan militants, would Pakistan attempt to infiltrate as most of these groups would be involved resolving factional differences or may be fighting the Afghan National Security Forces who today are better equipped, trained and motivated than in 1990s.

The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network would prefer to continue in Afghanistan rather than suffer losses in Kashmir. The militant threat to Kashmir would continue unabated from Pakistan rather than Afghanistan.

Lastly, the other Pashtun group operating along the Durand line is the TTP which has differences with the other Pashtun groups.

The factional animosity would keep them pre occupied for spatial domination in their own geographical vicinity rather than venture miles into Kashmir.

Col Bipin Pathak is a retired Army Officer from Military Intelligence and can be contacted at bipin146184@yahoo.com.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are the personal opinion of the author. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of Indian Observer Post and Indian Observer Post does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.